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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MATTHEW C. HARRIS
and GARY S. HARRIS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

No. 17042

THE UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY
and LESTER LORENZO LOOSEMORE,
Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

INTRODUCTION
The nature of the case, disposition by the lower court,
relief sought on appeal, and facts have been thoroughly and
accurately discussed in appellants' initial brief, and will
not be repeated here, except as discussed in the following
arguments.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE JEEP
DRIVER NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
I.

The facts in evidence presented a jury question on the

issue of jeep driver Talbot's negligence.
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Reasonable minds could differ on the issue of the jeep
driver's (Talbot's) negligence.

Substantial evidence in the

record, viewed in the light most favorable to Talbot demonstrates:
1.

There were no tail lights or signals operating on

the rear of the bus immediately prior to the accident

(Rec-

ord cited at Appellants' Brief, p. 4) in violation of Utah
law.
(R.

§41-6-121.10, Utah Code Ann.

(1953); Instruction No. 12

251).
2.

The bus driver (Loosernore) could have safely pulled

the bus completely off the highway in order to pick up his
passenger (Record cited at Appellants' Brief, pp. 2; 7, n.
5).

That Loosemore stopped where he did was a violation of

Utah law.

§41-6-101, Utah Code Ann. (1953); Instruction No.

11 (R. 249-50).

Loosemore himself testified that there was

nothing that would have prevented him from pulling off the
highway another ten feet.

(R. 625).

In fact the bus pulled

gradually over to the right over the course of 300 feet of
travel to where its right rear wheel was only four inches off
the pavement (R. 514; Plaintiffs' Exhibits No. 21 and No. 5).
3.

The highway was straight and posted at 50 m.p.h.,

with no semaphores or stop signs for several miles (R. 529).
Prior to the accident, jeep driver Talbot was traveling with

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the flow of traffic, within the posted speed limit at between
40 and 50 m.p.h.
4.

{R. 521, 549, 567, 577, 591, 728).

Bus driver Loosemore checked his rear view mirrors

300 feet from the waiting passenger, and did not look at his
mirrors again before the collision {R. 620).

The only car he

saw was a light colored station wagon and he made his stopping maneuver in the manner he did under the impression that
the light colored station wagon was the only affected vehicle.

{R. 618).

In fact, Talbot's jeep was closer to the bus

than the light colored station wagon; it was the first vehicle affected by the stopping bus.
5.

At the instant of collision the bus was still stop-

ping or had just stopped.
6.

{R. 576, 592).

{R. 561).

Jeep driver Talbot did not recall seeing the bus

before the instant he perceived the dangerous situation and
then reacted by swerving in an attempt to avoid colliding
with the bus.

He may have seen the bus before that instant,

but it did not "register" with him before that instant (R.
558).

Similarly, Helen Hollingshead, driver of the light

colored station wagon immediately behind the jeep, also had
no conscious memory of seeing the bus until "suddenly the
space between the jeep and the bus, and myself and the jeep
was getting narrow" {R. 579-80).

In order to herself avoid a

collision, she swerved across three traffic lanes, including
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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two oncoming traffic lanes and stopped on the opposite side
of the road (R. 579, 593).
7.

Emmet Quinn, an expert in the field of accident re-

construction, testified that it was entirely reasonable under
these circumstances that jeep driver Talbot did not perceive
that the bus was stopping until Talbot was relatively close
to the bus.

Based on the location of Talbot's skid marks,

and a one and one-half second "perception - reaction" time,
Quinn testified that Talbot was 150 feet from the point of
impact when Talbot first became aware the bus was stopping
(R. 729).

He testified that, absent stop signal lights, the

only way Talbot would perceive that the bus was stopping was
-the increasing size of the bus, i.e., the increasing portion
of Talbot's "cone of perception" taken by the bus (738).
Quinn testified that until Talbot was relatively close to the
bus, it would not appear to him to be stopping (738, 750).
At the point Talbot perceived that the bus was stopping it
had suddenly become three times larger in his "cone of perception" (737).

Quinn testified that the very purpose of

tail lights is to warn a person in the rear of a slowing or
stopping maneuver (738).

Without such lights, a slowing or

stopping maneuver is very difficult to perceive until the
driver in the rear is relatively close to the stopping vehicle (738, 750).

In fact, Quinn testified that from the point
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where Talbot perceived the bus and reacted, he made the best
possible effort to avoid the accident (740-41).

Quinn illus-

trated his testimony with a chart admitted as plaintiffs'
Exhibit 44.
The foregoing facts are sufficient to preclude a directed
finding of negligence against jeep driver Talbot and the
trial court erred in taking that issue from the jury.
Respondents argue that the jeep driver's negligence is
clear based upon his failure "to see a stopped bus which was
10 feet wide and 12 feet high on a clear dry morning with no
obstacles in front of the jeep and with a two mile straightaway preceding the location of the bus."
Brief, p. 13).

(Respondents'

That argument fails to take into account the

evidence discussed in the preceding paragraphs numbered one
through seven.

Particularly it fails to recognize that the

bus had no stop or signal lights, that it stopped in the
travel lane in a 50 m.p.h. stretch of highway, that the bus
had been progressing in the flow of traffic down the highway
creating the expectation to following cars that absent a signal or brake light on the bus or at least a significant movement to the right off the highway, it would continue to move
down the highway with the flow of traffic.

Plaintiffs have

never contended that the bus was not visible to following
traffic: rather plaintiffs contend that under the circumSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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stances drivers following the bus reasonably did not perceive
that the bus had created a dangerous situation; they reasonably did not perceive it as stopping until it had nearly
stopped.
That jeep driver Talbot and Helen Hollingshead in the
light colored station wagon were caught by surprise by the
stopping bus is discussed above.

Two cars back from Hol-

lingshead was Gloria Myers who observed the situation, including the jeep and the station wagon swerving to avoid collision.

Myers testified on cross-examination as follows:

Q.

Did you see the bus as it was slowing down?

A.

Sir, I didn't realize the bus was slowing down or

stopping.

We didn't have any indication it was stopping.

(R. 597)

To accept respondents' argument that the bus was large
and visible is to conclude that large vehicles are excused
from the law requiring brake and turn signal lights.
untenable.

That is

Respondents have not even addressed the testimony

of expert witness Quinn discussed above in paragraph number
7, regarding the difficulty in perceiving a stopping maneuver
absent stop or turn signal lights, nor have they addressed
the actual difficulty which Hollingshead and Myers, in addition to Talbot, had in perceiving that the bus was stopping.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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II

Respondents' cases.
Respondent relies on two cases in support of the trial

court's finding of Talbot's negligence as a matter of law:
Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d
989 (1961), and Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24
Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970).

Both cases are factually

distinguishable and therefore not useful.
In Velasguez a collision occurred between an Interstate
Motor Lines truck, which was stopped partially in a travel
lane, and a moving Greyhound bus.

"The truck's clearance

lights, stop lights, and blinkers were turned on before the
driver alighted, and they remained on."

366 P.2d at 990.

That fact alone distinguishes Velasguez, but there is more:
The Greyhound bus driver, by his own admission saw
the Interstate truck as he approached. He said he
first observed it from about three-fourths mile away
and that he realized that both the truck and the
Buckley car were stopped while he was still one-half
mile away. 366 P.2d at 990 (emphasis added).
In that context, the Velasquez court stated that "if
there had been flares out, or even if the truck had been
aflame, it could have given him no-more information."

Id.

The court continued:
[The bus driver] said he intended to stop behind the
truck to render assistance and to add the benefit of
his lights to the scene • • • • The evidence is without dispute that as the Greyhound bus approached
this scene a very strange thing happened: the bus
driver momentarily lost consciousness by either
falling asleep or blacking out from some other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cause. He was roused to consciousness just before
the impact by the warning cry of a woman passenger:
"Don't hit it." He swerved the bus to the left but
not in time to avoid hitting the left rear corner of
the truck. 366 P.2d at 991.
Thus, in addition to undisputed evidence of operating
clearance lights, stop lights and blinkers, the approaching
bus driver in Velasquez correctly perceived the stopped vehicles while he was a half-mile away.
with it.

Nevertheless he collided

On those facts a directed finding of negligence may

be appropriate, but those facts are far different from the
facts in the instant case.

Velasquez, therefore, does not

support the directed negligence finding against Talbot herein.
In Anderson, supra, a Red-E-Mix cement truck driver had
parked his truck against the curb about 150 feet from an intersection in Brigham City.

He was engaged in washing out

his truck when it was struck by plaintiff's host's vehicle.
The driver of that vehicle was 15 years old and had taken the
automobile without leave.

Plaintiff and another boy, both

also age 15, were passengers.

The driver stopped his car at

the intersection and waited for oncoming traffic to clear so
he could turn left.

He started to make his left turn when he

over-accellerated causing the car to slide.

The court stated

plaintiff's version of the facts, in the light most favorable
to him, as follows:
While he was thus proceeding west with the read end
in a sideways slide and approximately 50 feet west
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the curb line, he first noticed the defendant's
truck parked on the roadway. The driver at that
point had sufficiently regained control and he
thought he could avoid collision by proceeding to
the southwest and around the left side of the truck,
but he failed to observe the steel chute extending
to the rear and collided with the extended chute • .
467 P.2d at 46 (emphasis original).
The Supreme Court affirmed the Anderson trial court's
granting of a motion to dismiss following trial, reasoning
that the driver had acknowledged observing the cement truck
which was "stan~ing there as big as life and twice as natural."

Having regained control of his sliding vehicle, he

"had about 100 feet in which to brake and/or turn aside and
avoid the collision with this large truck which stood there
in plain sight."

467 P.2d at 47.

Again, those facts are not our facts.

Both Velasquez and

Anderson are cases in which the following driver observed a
static situation ahead and negligently failed to avoid it.
The Supreme Court carefully analyzed both those cases as fitting the "first situation" discussed in Hillyard v. Utah
By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953)
Hillyard's "first situation" deals with static situations
where the dangerous condition, i.e., a vehicle stopped within
the travel lane of following vehicles, has been in place for
a period of time and under circumstances which legally and
reasonably impose upon all arriving drivers' knowledge of its
presence and appreciation of the danger.

In such cases the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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approaching driver's negligence becomes an intervening and
thus sole proximate cause, and that negligence and proximate
cause may exist as a matter of law.
Hillyard's "second situation" deals with dynamic situations where the first driver's conduct and the following
driver's conduct are concurrent, or so nearly so, that the
following driver's conduct cannot be held to be negligence or
proximate cause as a matter of law.

In such cases, both the

issues of negligence and proximate cause are for the jury.
For example, in Stapley v. Salt Lake City Lines, 18 Utah
2d 1, 414 P.2d 88 (1966)

(discussed in more detail in appel-

lants brief, p. 8), involving nearly identical facts to the
instant case, the Court approved the submission of the appreaching driver's negligence to the jury, stating that the
jury is properly the
arbiter of the facts, negligence, contributory
negligence, cause of the injury, and the like •
414 P.2d at 89.
Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978), hereinafter
"Watters I"; Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 611
P.2d 363 (Utah 1980); and Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455
(Utah 1981), hereinafter "Watters II", are all recent Utah
cases involving Hillyard's "second situation."

In each case

the jury was allowed to consider the issue Of the approaching
driver's negligence.

In Watters I and.!.!.' this was true even
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though the approaching driver was admittedly momentarily inattentive, which is the worst that can be said of jeep driver
Talbot herein.
The present case is one in which the facts giving rise to
the accident were dynamic, and within Hillyard's "second situation" discussed above.

Therefore all issues of negligence

and proximate cause should have been submitted to the jury.

POINT II
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 IMPROPERLY STATES THE
LAW AND IN EFFECT DIRECTS JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE PLAINTIFF

Instruction No. 14 (R. 253) is quoted in appellants' and
respondents' briefs.

In that instruction the trial court:

1.

Directs negligence against jeep driver Talbot;

2.

In effect directs a finding that Talbot's negligence

was the sole proximate cause, using Hillyard's "first situation" language; and
3.

Improperly instructs on the Hillyard "second situa-

tion."
The error in directing negligence against Talbot has already been discussed at length.

Compounding that error is

the manner in which that directed negligence is tied to proximate cause in Instruction No. 14:
To be an independent intervening cause that
would relieve another's negligence from being a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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proximate cause, it must be negligence that was not
foreseeable.
In that regard, you are instructed that the
driver of the Jeep, Rodney Talbot, was negligent as
a matter of law, and if you find that he observed
the bus stopped upon the highway, or, under the circumstances should have observed the bus, but because
of his negligence failed to do so in time to avoid
the accident, then you are instructed that the negligence on his part was the sole proximate cause of
the collision.
(Emphasis added) •
The only negligence claimed against Talbot was his negligent failure to observe the bus in time to avoid it.
negligence is what the court directed.

That

Thus, under this in-

struction the conclusion that Talbot's negligence was the
sole proximate cause is inescapable.
With Talbot thus having been found negligent and the sole
proximate cause of the accident, how could the jury find
other than "no negligence" on the part of bus driver and bus
company?

In effect the court excused any negligent conduct

(improper stopping, no tail lights, improper lookout, etc.)
on the part of the defendants by finding Talbot negligent and
in effect, the sole proximate cause.
Respondents argue that this instruction correctly covers
the situation of "whether Talbot had sufficient time to
observe the bus but failed to do so and, consequently, was
the sole proximate cause of the accident."
Brief p. 24).

(Respondents'

However, the correct test is more than just

"time" -- it is perception and appreciation of the danger,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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yet negligence in avoiding that danger.

That perception and

appreciation was not present here due to Loosemore's stopping
where he did, without lights, etc, as discussed above.
Respondents further claim that this portion of Instruction No. 14 is proper because it closely resembles that given
in McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P.2d 711
(1959).

That it closely resembles the McMurdie instruction

is reason enough to conclude its inappropriateness here.
McMurdie, like Velasquez and Anderson, supra, also relied
upon by respondents, is a Hillyard "first situation" case.
In McMurdie, at about 1:45 a.m. a driver named Whittaker
stopped for several large trailer-trucks, some of which had
blocked Whittaker's lane of travel.

Whittaker waited for

oncoming traffic to clear before attempting to pass the
trailer-trucks.

The court stated:

While parked in this position Whittaker noticed in
his rear view mirror the approach of a speeding
pickup truck. He pressed his brakes hard to light
the bright red rear lights of his car and he also
turned on his turn signal light. The pickup truck
continued coming until it crashed into the rear of
[Whittaker's] automobile. 346 P.2d at 712 (Emphasis
added) •
The occupants of Whittaker's car were severely injured.
On those facts, at the pretrial conference, the court held
the pickup truck driver negligent as a matter of law.
pickup driver then settled all claims against her.

The

The case

then proceeded to trial with Whittaker and his occupants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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seeking to recover against the drivers of the large trailertrucks who had blocked Whittaker's travel lane.

The court

instructed the jury as follows:
You are instructed that the driver of the pickup truck was negligent as a matter of law, and if
you find that she observed the hazards, if any, of
the stopped vehicles upon the highway or under the
circumstances should have observed said vehicles,
but because of her negligence failed to do so in
· time to avoid said accident, then you are instructed
that the ne~ligence on her part was the sole proximate cause of the collision, and your verdict must
be in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action.
Several obvious factual distinctions make that same instruction erroneous in the instant case.

It was undisputed

in McMurdie that the brake lights and turn signals were operating on the stopped vehicle, and there was therefore not the
"perception of stopping" problem testified to by Emmmett
Quinn in the instant case.

McMurdie is thus clearly a Hill-

yard "first situation" case.
McMurdie also involved a speeding approaching vehicle
which was further evidence of that driver's negligence.
There are no such facts of negligence against jeep driver
Talbot.
Justice Wade dissented in McMurdie, agreeing with appellants' contention there that the instruction
directed a verdict against them:
This instruction in effect directs a verdict
against plaintiffs. It declares the pickup truck
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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driver negligent as a matter of law. Then it
directs a finding that such driver's negligence was
the sole proximate cause of the accident and a verdict agai~st plaintiffs if the jury finds her negligent on either one of the only two grounds of negligence chargeable against her. I think this instruction was erroneous. 346 P.2d at 714.
After analyzing Hillyard and related cases, Justice Wade
concluded:
[T]he second driver must not only see the
parked truck but appreciate the danger in order to
exonerate the original tort-feasor. This, I think,
is the correct rule and requires extraordinary
negligence on the part of the second tort-feasor to
relieve the first from liability. 346 P.2d at 717
(emphasis added).
That extraordinary negligence takes the form of Hillyard's "first situation", where the approaching vehicle saw,
or could not have failed to have seen the dangerous situation, yet negligently failed to avoid it.

That was the case

in Velasquez (bus driver saw stopped truck and recognized
situation one-half mile away); Anderson (car driver had control of own vehicle, saw stopped cement truck but negligently
failed to miss it); and McMurdie (stopped vehicle had stop
lights and turn signals operating -- approaching speeding car
observed but failed to avoid collision).

That extraordinary

negligence is not present in the instant case, nor was it
present in Watters I or II, even though the approaching
driver there was admittedly inattentive.
in Stapley v.

s.

L.

c.

It was not present

Lines, which has facts nearly

identical
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to the instant case, nor was it present in Hillyard's "second
situation", where the approaching driver failed to see the
dangerous situation until too late to avoid it.

All of those

cases, similar to the instant case, submitted the negligence
and proximate cause issues to the jury.
The concluding paragraph of Instruction No. 14 in the
instant case further compounds its error.

That portion

states:
If you find Talbot did not observe the bus in
time to avoid it, and it could reasonably be anticipated that circumstances may arise wherein one may
not observe such a dangerous condition until too
late to escape (i.e., reasonably anticipated that an
emergency might arise), then his negligence would
not be the sole proximate cause.
(R. 253).
Respondents argue that the above instruction correctly
covers the situation of "whether Talbot was put into an
emergency situation in which he had no time to observe the
bus • • • "
situation."

They argue that "the evidence showed no emergency
(Respondents' brief, pp. 24, 27).

Their narrow

reliance on emergency situations limits Hillyard's "second
situation" too far.

In Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. and

Tel. Co., 611 P.2d 363, 366 (Utah 1980), this Court recently
put the "emergency" limitation to rest:
Mountain Bell maintains that the language in
Hillyard, discussing emergency situations indicates
that it is only in such situations that the negligence of the first actor can remain active so as to
constitute a concurring proximate cause together
with the negligence of the later actor. However, a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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close reading of Hillyard as well as the treatment
of the Hillyard rule in later cases leads us to the
conclusion that the true basis of the rule rests on
the concept of the legal forseeability of the subsequent negligence. The reference to emergency situations is based more on the factual setting presented
in Hillyard than on limiting application of the rule
only to emergency situations. This conclusion is
strengthened by this Court's latest treatment of the
Hillyard rule found in Watters v. Querry. Although
Watters involved a situation where the driver of a
car stopped abruptly, the words "emergency situation" are nowhere mentioned.
Thus Instruction No. 14 is further fatally flawed by its
erroneous emphasis on the necessity of an emergency situation.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED BUS
DRIVER LOOSEMORE NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW
Respondents seek to excuse bus driver Loosemore's actions; a brief response is appropriate.
1.

Improper lookout.

Loosemore testified that he looked in his mirrors 300
feet from the waiting passenger.

He only recalled seeing a

light colored station wagon on the road behind him.

He re-

called no others specifically, except perhaps "back down the
road farther" than the light colored station wagon.
617-18).

{R.

In any event the light colored station wagon was

the only vehicle that he felt he "would have to look out for
a nd keep safe • "

{R. 61 7 ) •
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Respondents argue that "it was disputed whether the jeep
would even have been in the immediate range of the mirror
when the stop was made," as they claim the jeep was further
back than the light colored station wagon.

(Respondents'

Brief, pp. 22-23).
In fact every witness to the accident places the jeep
immediately behind the bus, with the light colored station
wagon behind the jeep.
Myers, R. 591-93).

(See, eg, Hollingshead, R. 576-78;

Thus, Loosemore failed to see the vehicle

first affected by his stop, and never looked again at his
mirrors until he heard the screech of the jeep's brakes.

(R.

629-630).
2.

Stopping on the highway.

Respondents concede that §41-6-101, Utah Code Ann. (1953)
sets the standard of care in this case as to the location of
Loosemore's stop, and that violation of that statute is
negligence absent reasonable justification or excuse.
(Respondents' Brief, pp 18-19).

That statute provides, in

relevant part:
[N]o person shall stop, park, or leave standing any
vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the
paved or main traveled part of the highway when it
is practical to stop, park, or so leave such vehicle
off such part of said highway, but in every event an
unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of
other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped
vehicle shall be available from a distance of 200
feet in each direction upon such highway.
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A.

Unobstructed width of highway; 200 feet of clear view.

Under that statute "a driver must always park off the
highway when practical to do; the other requirements of clear
view and sufficient passing space are not pertinent unless
and until it is shown that it is impractical to park off the
highway at the particular place in question."

Horrocks v.

Rounds, 370 P.2d 799 (N.M. 1962); McElhanex v. Rouse, 415
P.2d 241 {Kan. 1966).
Therefore, respondents' arguments of visibility and unobstructed adjacent highway (Respondents' Brief, pp. 3, 17) are
without merit unless it was impractical for Loosemore to have
pulled off the highway.
B.

"Impractical."

Many reported cases deal with statutes of other states
which are identical in wording with §41-6-101, Utah Code Ann.
(1953).

For example, Chard v. Bowen, 427 P.2d 568, (Idaho

1967), discusses those factors which might excuse compliance
with the statute, stating:
To prove that a violation of a statute was excusable or justifiable so as to overcome the presumption of negligence, the evidence must support a
finding that the violation resulted from causes or
things that made compliance with the statute impossible, something over which the person charged with
the violation had no control which placed his vehicle in a position violative of the statute, or an
emergency not of such person's own making by reason
of which he fails to obey the statute, and that the
person who violated the statute did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence
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who desired to comply with the law, acting under
similar circumstances. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).

c.

Evidence.

Loosemore's "justification" for stopping where he did
must be reasonable; it cannot be frivolous.

If he presented

no evidence of reasonable justification a directed negligence
finding against him is appropriate.

As justification, he

claims the following:,
1.

"He felt unsafe • • • because of a large ditch

which adjoined the shoulder of the road."

(Repondents'

brief, p. 17, citing Loosemore's testimony at R. 623-24.)
Yet on the very next transcript page, p. 625, Loosemore
qualified his statement after being shown photographs of the
accident scene.

He then stated there was, in fact, nothing

that would have prevented him from pulling off another ten
feet.

(R. 625).
2.

His main concern was passenger convenience.

(R. 622-23, 644).

Even assuming that it was more convenient

for the passenger that Loosemore stop where he did, that concern is frivolous in view of the clear language of the statute and Loosemore's admission that he could have pulled off
the traveled portion of the highway.

The cited portion of

Chard v. Bowen, supra, uses terms impossible, or emergency-not convenience.
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Even if passenger convenience were a possible justif ication, Loosemore testified that he stopped 3-4 feet from the
passenger (R. 627).

His own expert, Rudolph Limpert, testi-

fied that, had Loosemore pulled off even two additional feet,
there would have been no collision (R. 802).
In General Ins. Co. of America v. Lewis, 121 Utah 440,
243 P.2d 433 (1952), this Court stated that the statute applied to those "cases where the driver stops his car on the
highway from his own choice and has an opportunity to select
the place and conditions of his stop."

243 P.2d at 434.

This is just such a case, and Loosemore's lame "justifications" do not merit submission to the jury.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in holding jeep driver Talbot
negligent as a matter of law as the facts in evidence presented a jury question on that issue.

Utah case law supports

the proposition that in "dynamic" fact situations, such as
this case, all issues of negligence and proximate cause are
for the jury.
The trial court erred in its Instruction No. 14 and in
effect thereby directed judgment against the plaintiffs herein.

The instruction improperly stated the tests laid down by
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this Court in Hillyard, Watters and Jensen v. Mountain States
Telephone.
Having held Talbot negligent as a matter of law, the
trial court should have also held defendant Loosemore negligent as a matter of law for his failure to exercise proper
lookout and for his unexcused illegal stop on the traveled
portion of the highway, where he admitted there was no reason
he could not have pulled completely off said highway as required by §41-6-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953).
For the foregoing reasons the judgment herein should be
reversed and vacated and remanded for a new trial on the
issues which remain.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of December, 1981.
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